On March 25, Kim Zetter published an astonishing story describing a supply-chain attack against ASUS which was run between June and November 2018. The ASUS Live Update software was backdoored in order to attack a very specific group of targets. The campaign, named ShadowHammer, was discovered and investigated by Kaspersky Lab, which will present the full details during SAS2019.
Nowadays it is fairly common for malware authors to use some form of process injection. The real malicious PE file (dll or exe) is hidden beneath one or more layers of wrappers which try to execute it as stealthly as possible, for example by injecting it in a seemingly harmless process. There is a wide variety of techniques to achieve process injection (check out this nice summary). For malware analysts the external layers of protection are just a nuance, and the most interesting code is in the final executable that is injected, so getting to it as quickly as possible is a primary goal. That is why I wanted to automate as much as possible the extraction procedure, for which I built a tool called whack-a-proc.
Flare-On is one of the most challenging CTFs of the year when it comes to reverse engineering. In this post I will present an approach to solve level 9 based on hooking program functions with the aid of my library APIhooklib. This will not be a complete solution, the focus will be on the decryption of the VB script, which I consider the hardest part to tackle in this challenge. For a full walkthrough I recommend the one posted by the Flare team itself (link).
This quick analysis presents the main features and elements regarding the ransomware Septis. I will not explain exactly how it was cracked, because nobody wants to help a ransomware author to fix his vile creation. There are, however, enough elements to guide any further analysis by curious minds to reach the core of its vulnerability.
Here we go again with another crackme by hasherezade. I would like to stress the fact that it is a very good learning tool, because of its malware-like behavior and the many different features it has. Here is my write-up.
In the plethora of bad ransomware that infests the internet these days, sometimes a “gem” stands out. This is the case of Bitpaymer. It targets companies, with ad-hoc samples for each victim, and it requires ransoms way above the average “spray-and-pray” ransomware. To attack such high-profile targets, it uses a set of features that you rarely find in ransomware: the use of ADSs, multiple layers of encryption and packing, and an elaborated system to hide calls to the Windows API. The focus of this post is the latter.
Windows API hooks are among the best friends of infosec people. For example, bad guys use them for stealing information or hiding their files/processes; on the other hand they are found in security tools to detect malicious behaviors.
There is a number of tools and frameworks for this job, with different features and scopes. I would like to cite two of them: APIMonitor is extremely useful to get both the input and the output of an API call, but lacks the possibility of setting custom hooks. Pin, the Intel dynamic binary instrumentation framework, is powerful, as it allows to perform analysis at a very low level, even for each instruction that is executed. Unfortunately this power comes at the price of performances, as Pin instroduces a considerable overhead in the execution. Moreover, as a personal critic, developing programs that use Pin (aka Pin Tools) is not exactly straightforward.
My goal for APIhooklib was to have an instrument to analyze the execution of a generic program by means of API calls. The library should stands in between the two aforementioned tools, which means custom hooks, low overhead and simple development.
CTFs and challenges mainly based on reverse engineering are a bit uncommon, so when I find one I am always happy to devote some time to try and solve it. This write-up will be on the crackme created by hasherezade. To make the reading more spicy I decided to explain my thought process while going through the challenge, instead of writing a plain (boring) solution.
As everyone in the infosec community, I wanted to get my hands on the latest malware case, the infamous NotPetya, EternalPetya, WhateveryouwantPetya. Let me start with a disclamer: I am completely out the naming debate, but for the sake of my mental health I will call it NotPetya from now on.
We can find many different means for malwares to spread: just to name a couple, the evergreen of email spam, with that nasty invoice.pdf.exe attachment, or some Viagra malvertising leading to an Exploit Kit. But malware authors also look for more “unusual” ways to move around their products. A very interesting one is pastebin, the well-known service to quickly distribute chunks of text online. The idea of monitoring pastebin comes from sudosev, who proposed to look for Base64 encodings of Windows executables (i.e. PE files) among the content that goes through pastebin. To achieve this goal he used used pastemonitor: the name is self-explanatory, this service stores pastes and allows the user to look for specific strings or regular expressions. sev perfomed the analysis manually, so I decided to take his very good idea and automatize it.
2016 has been a year full of ransomwares, and the trend doesn’t seem to change in the new year. Many “sophisticated” pieces of malware have been developed, from Locky, to Cerber, to the more recent Spora. But in the wild sometimes strange examples of wannabe-ransomware can appear, as the one we will look at here. Actually I’m writing this post just to make some fun of this script-kiddie masterpiece, so do not expect any obscure technique or advanced feature presented here.